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What is liquidity and why do central banks
care?
Liquidity — in terms of a monetary aggregate rather than ease
of trading an asset — can be defined as narrow (or
high-powered or central bank) money at one extreme;  or the
widest definition of broad money aggregates at the other.
Both are of interest to central banks, as they have implications
for both monetary and financial stability.(1) Increasingly,
cross-border linkages mean that liquidity imbalances in one
country can lead to spillovers into another economy.  This is
most obviously the case with the broader definition of
liquidity:  investors facing a shortage of domestic assets
(excess liquidity can also be viewed as a shortage of assets)(2)
may try to access foreign assets;  this will normally involve
foreign exchange markets and cross-border transactions.  To
the extent central bank and commercial bank balances are
interchangeable in the wholesale money markets, disequilibria
in high-powered money may also spillover cross-border —
evidenced by market behaviour in the United States, the
United Kingdom and the euro area in August–September 2007.
When this Handbook talks about ‘liquidity’, what is meant is
the narrow definition — a subset of central bank liabilities —
rather than a broader monetary aggregate.  In particular, it is
the domestic-currency denominated,non-interest-bearing
liabilities of the central bank held by the non-state sector.
Central banks typically manage monetary policy by controlling
the cost of this liquidity (whether indirectly, via the cost of
commercial bank borrowing from the central bank to fund the
liabilities, or directly via the cost at which its liabilities are
remunerated) and thus, through arbitrage, the cost of
interbank funds.  But if there is either too much or too little of
this liquidity in the market, the central bank will find it harder
to manage monetary policy;  and most central banks therefore
try to manage market liquidity in a manner which will facilitate
the implementation of monetary policy.
Central banks tend to forecast banks’ free reserves, and
estimate excess reserves (see definitions, below), because they
believe:
(i) that a disequilibrium — whether too much or too little
liquidity — tends to promote behaviour by banks which
the central bank does not want;  and therefore
(ii) that the central bank may need to react in order to
continue implementing an appropriate monetary policy
stance.
If there is a shortage of liquidity, then the central bank will
(almost) always supply the need.  There have been a few
occasions where a central bank has not been able to supply
sufficient cash to meet the economy’s needs — notably when
there is hyperinflation or civil unrest (or in one LatinAmerican
country, when the central bank printers went on strike) — and
people may then resort to barter or increased dollarisation.
But this is very unusual.  As regards a shortage of commercial
bank reserves held at the central bank, the risk is that a
shortage would mean payments could not be cleared at the
end of the day.  It is to avoid this risk that central banks have in
place credit standing facilities (SFs) — though they will
normally aim to supply liquidity via open market operations
(OMO) — to avoid spikes in market interest rates.  Commercial
banks might have sufficient balances for payments purposes,
but be short of reserves balances in terms of meeting reserve
requirements (RRs) or liquid asset ratios (LARs).  Since the
interest rate penalty of a shortfall is typically the same as for
accessing the credit SF or higher, the impact on banks’
behaviour will be similar, so that central banks will where
possible supply the necessary liquidity via OMO.  In any case,
liquidity will nearly always be supplied, albeit possibly at a
high price, so that ex-post liquidity shortages are unusual.
The consequences of a liquidity surplus are not the
mirror-image of a shortage, and central bank structures are not
therefore always symmetrical.  There is no risk of payment
system failure because of a surplus of liquidity, nor of a failure
to meet reserve requirements.  Arguably, there is therefore less
need for a deposit SF.  But there will be consequences of a
surplus on the behaviour of commercial banks, which typically
run counter to the policy goals of the central bank.  The
immediate consequence of excess liquidity is that short-term
interest rates will fall, potentially close to zero.  This is evident
in a number of countries.  Banks could try to offset this loss of
income by making riskier loans in search of yield (with
consequences for financial stability and possibly inflation, if
there is excessive lending);  or they might refuse to take
customer deposits, especially interest-bearing deposits (with
consequences for the development of financial intermediation,
and possibly inflation if this encourages consumption rather
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(1) See for instance ‘What is global excess liquidity, and does it matter?’, Ruffer, R and
Stracca, L (2006), ECB Working Paper no. 696.
(2) See for instance, taking the broad definition, ‘On the macroeconomics of asset
shortages’, Caballero, R (2006), NBER Working Paper no. 12753.6 Handbook No. 27  Liquidity forecasting
than saving);  or they might try to move into foreign exchange
where some return on balances is available (with
consequences for either the exchange rate or the central
bank’s foreign exchange reserves, or both;  and possibly for
inflation if the exchange rate depreciates).
Some central banks eg in the Far East have observed that when
the market has a large structural surplus of liquidity, the
interest-rate transmission mechanism of monetary policy
weakens.  This again points to an impact on monetary policy
implementation.
If the market swings from a surplus to a shortage from day to
day — so that even the direction of the disequilibrium is
unpredictable — short-term interest rates will be more volatile
that would otherwise be the case (this will tend to impede
development of the longer-term end of the market) and banks
will be more reluctant to take positions because of the risks
involved.
In other words, liquidity forecasting and management is part
of the central bank’s goal of stabilising the value of money —
whether this means, in a given context, stabilising the
domestic value by keeping inflation low, or stabilising the
external value by keeping the exchange rate(1) at a particular
level.  And it supports the broader goal of financial market
stability, by reducing the risks which can arise from short-term
price volatility.
The ECB Monthly Bulletin (May 2002) noted, in the context of
liquidity management:
‘Central bank liquidity management comprises assessing
the liquidity needs of the banking system and supplying or
absorbing the appropriate amount of liquidity through open
market operations.’
This implies that liquidity management, at least for the ECB, is
essentially accommodative.  With such an approach, the
central bank does not pre-determine a path for liquidity
(reserve money) growth, it simply aims to supply the net
requirements of the market, whatever the requirement is.
This approach may be easier when the market is characterised
by a structural deficit of liquidity (eg the United Kingdom, the
United States, the euro area and Japan), since there is a
marginal cost to banks in obtaining liquidity — they need to
borrow from the central bank — and excess reserves are
typically not remunerated.  Banks have an incentive to hold
the right amount — enough for payments purposes but
minimal costly excess.  Where there is a structural surplus of
liquidity, however, the incentive structure may be less obvious.
In principle, there may be no difference:  banks will still want
enough for payments purposes and minimal costly excess.  But
if the central bank leaves some excess liquidity in the market,
so that short-term market rates are very low, the opportunity
cost of holding excess balances at the central bank may be
seen as small.  Banks might then exhibit only a sluggish
response to excess holdings of liquidity, and it can be harder to
determine, behaviourally, where the boundary lies between
desired and excess reserves.
It follows from the purpose of the liquidity forecast, that the
forecast should be seen in the context of the central bank’s
liquidity management policy and operations.  If liquidity is to
be managed using OMO — ie transactions where the central
bank takes the initiative — the central bank must have a good
forecast.
Definitions of liquidity
The task of forecasting liquidity involves a forecast of the
balance sheet of the central bank, so that, by residual, the
central bank can judge the scope of its market interventions in
order to maintain the appropriate level of liquidity in the
economy.
It is important to differentiate between the various liabilities
on the central bank’s balance sheet (Table A).
Not all central bank liabilities are fully liquid, and not all are
held by the non-state sector.  For instance:
• government deposits with the central bank are liquid, but
the government will not necessarily respond to ‘excess’
deposits in the same way as a private sector bank;(2)
• term deposits or central bank bills, normally a form of OMO
used to drain excess liquidity, are interest-bearing and are a
response to excess liquidity;
• required or contractual reserves may represent free liquidity
from day to day if there is a system of reserve averaging, but
cannot be freely used over the maintenance period as a
whole;
(1) Nominal, real or trade weighted.
(2) Some central and regional government treasuries do hold surplus funds with
commercial banks (whether private or state sector) if balances at the central bank are
not remunerated.
Table A The central bank’s balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Foreign exchange (net) Cash
Credit to government Government balances
OMO:  credit to banks OMO:  liquidity drain
Standing facility:  credit to banks Standing facility:  liquidity drain
Other Banks’ free reserves
Banks’ required reserves 
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• foreign debt is interest-bearing and is not in domestic
currency;  and
• capital and reserves of the central bank are not held by the
non-state sector.(1)
Cash is clearly non-interest bearing, held by the non-state
sector, and liquid;  there could be an excess or a deficit of it in
the economy.  Commercial bank current account balances
constitute ‘free’ reserves which may or may not be ‘excess’.
As a final point here, it is often far from clear just how to move
from a published central bank balance sheet to the pro-forma
structure used above.  Central bank staff may need to do some
work with their accounts department in order to be able to
produce a balance sheet — at least broken down into the
major items — that is operationally useful for liquidity
management.
What are free and excess reserves?
All funds in banks’ current accounts could be defined as free
reserves, to the extent that banks are free to use the funds on
any given day.  Where there is (i) an required reserves (RR)
regime and reserve averaging is practiced, or (ii) a voluntary
contractual reserves (VCR) regime, these reserves are likely to
be maintained in the commercial banks’ current accounts at
the central bank.  This means that balance sheet data are not
sufficient to indicate whether a bank has free or excess
reserves:  the liquidity forecaster needs to know in addition
what the RR/VCR target levels are.
It is important in this case to distinguish between what might
be ‘free’ balances — ie can be used freely — on a given day, and
what are free for the reserve maintenance period as a whole.
On any given day, a bank can run its balance at the central
bank down to zero (or whatever lower bound is set), even if at
that point it holds less than the reserve target, whether for
that day or for the maintenance period up to that point.  But
over the reserve maintenance period as a whole, it is not free
to do so.  A bank may of course end a period with reserves
lower than its target;  but this is not a ‘free’ option — there will
be an interest rate penalty — and central banks will normally
work on the assumption that each bank aims at least to meet
its reserves target, and manages liquidity accordingly.
The central bank could, in general terms, define ‘excess’
reserves as anything above the level desired by commercial
banks.  This begs the question:  what level do commercial
banks want to hold?
Some banks will always want to hold a certain amount of
reserves voluntarily, for payments system liquidity and perhaps
for precautionary motives.  Where there is a regime of RR with
no averaging,(2) banks hold voluntary (or ‘demanded’) reserves
on top of the required level for transactions purposes.  Where
averaging is allowed, banks typically have to hold higher
balances — on average — than they would voluntarily chose.
Since the averaging mechanism provides them with scope for
liquidity management, one might expect a priori that any
balances held above the reserve requirement level would be
excess to demand.  Indeed, some commentators define any
reserves held on top of required reserves as ‘excess’.  But this
may not be correct, for various reasons, either on any given
day, or for the maintenance period as a whole.
In some countries, liquidity forecasters can assume that the
banking system as a whole will target reserves of marginally
more than the RR target — perhaps between 0.25%–0.5%
above the RR level in the euro area, for instance.  If the
combination of the central bank’s OMO and reserve averaging
provides ample scope for liquidity management, then banks
will tend to target marginally above the RR target.  As there is
some stigma associated with a shortfall (the interest rate cost
of a shortfall or an excess is normally symmetrical), banks have
a small incentive to err on the side of a surplus.  But in some
countries, where the use of OMO is less predictable and access
to the credit SF is seen as very expensive, some banks will hold
a larger, but less predictable, buffer above the RR target.  The
size of the targeted buffer will be a function of the uncertainty
of the central bank’s operations;  the operational structure and
its relationship to the setting of monetary policy;  possibly of
exchange rate speculation;  and of the reliability of the
payment system and commercial banks’ internal treasury
systems.  Changes in any of these will affect the size of the
targeted buffer, making it harder to estimate the level of
desired reserves, and thus by residual of excess reserves.
Similar forecasting problems can arise if the level of RR is not
high enough to provide all banks with enough scope for
liquidity management — as in the United States at present —
or if reserves are held on a purely voluntary basis — as in
Australia.  In both cases, the central bank has to estimate the
desired level of voluntarily-held reserves before it can decide
whether the forecast actual level of reserves is on target or
not.  To some extent, the central bank may have to be guided
by the behaviour of the market.  It may observe that if the
level of free reserves is within a certain band (this may be
thought of as a ‘comfort zone’), short-term market rates will
reflect the policy rate;  whereas if reserves are above or below
that band, market behaviour responds by moving interest rates
or changing demand for foreign exchange.
This handbook takes the view that it is important to distinguish
between free reserves — whether or not they are on top of
required reserves — and reserves which exceed the commercial
banks’ demand for them.  Thus excess reserves are a subset of
(1) There are rare exceptions, where the central bank’s capital is held by the private
sector;  but this is normally for historical reasons, and this capital could not behave in
the same way as excess liquidity.
(2) Reserve requirement averaging is discussed in detail in Handbook No. 24.8 Handbook No. 27  Liquidity forecasting
free reserves:  it is not an alternative term for the same thing.
Commercial banks’ behaviour will be different, depending on
whether balances held at the central bank are (i) held
voluntarily (desired, or demanded, reserves), in which case the
banks will want to keep them;  or (ii) in excess of the desired
level, in which case the banks will seek to convert them into an
asset which carries some form of return.  What matters to the
central bank is the behaviour of commercial banks seeking to
get rid of excess reserves,(1) or avoiding the risk of a shortfall.
Can there be excess cash?
In most countries, cash is supplied on demand;  and because
there is a cost to holding cash, the economy as a whole does
not make excessive demands.  Central banks will therefore
tend to assume that supply of cash equals demand, and that —
by contrast with commercial banks balances at the central
bank — there is never an ‘excess’ of cash which might affect
behaviour.  This should be true as long as commercial banks
are free to return excess cash holdings to the central bank;  and
that there are efficient and cost-effective means for any
(temporarily) surplus cash to flow from the economy via the
commercial banks back to the central bank.
But there are exceptions to this.  In a few countries with less
developed financial systems — ‘cash economies’ — there can
be excess cash in circulation.  This normally arises when a
government pays salaries (and perhaps pensions) in cash;  and
is often associated with monetary financing (the central bank’s
balance sheet expands as the government borrows from it to
withdraw cash).  The cash may find its way back to the central
bank via the banking system, or could be left in the economy
with potentially inflationary consequences.  The latter scenario
is more likely to happen where a large part of the economy is
unbanked (one reason for salaries being paid in cash in the first
place), and the mechanisms for returning surplus cash to the
central bank are inadequate or non-existant.(2)
The task of forecasting this form of excess liquidity — excess
cash in circulation — may be harder than simply forecasting
demand for cash when it is only supplied on demand, as there
may be no normal, base level to compare with;  but in such a
case it may be more important.
Should account be taken of non-domestic currencies?
Having defined the task of liquidity forecasting as estimating
(i) the future level of domestic-currency, non-interest-bearing
central bank liabilities held by the non-state sector and (ii) the
demand for such liabilities, it is worth considering the impact
of non-domestic currencies in a (semi) dollarised economy.
It is impossible for a central bank to know how much foreign
currency cash is circulating in its economy.  Data for domestic
currency in issue can be taken from the central bank’s own
balance sheet, and data for domestic currency in circulation by
adjusting this for reported vault cash held by banks.  But there
is no such record of foreign currency in circulation, and no
prospect of obtaining accurate reporting of such holdings.
It can nevertheless be useful for a central bank to know
whether the level of dollarisation is changing.  This will help it
to understand what is driving the growth in domestic currency
in circulation and whether it might be excessive, inflationary
etc.  For instance, if there is substantial de-dollarisation, then
as the population switches from foreign to domestic currency,
the volume of domestic currency will increase faster than the
growth rate of/demand for total transactional cash in the
economy.  Rapid growth in domestic currency in circulation
may not be a problem.  It might be possible periodically to
undertake surveys(3) to get an idea of the level, and more
importantly changes in the level, of dollarisation in order to be
able to form a judgement on this.  A few central banks do so.
If a central bank finds that substantial use is made of its
currency in other countries — notably the US dollar and the
euro — it may be useful to estimate such holding for the
purposes of analysing currency demand;  and to forecast it
separately, as it may behave differently to cash demanded
domestically.
It is reasonable to assume in most cases that there is unlikely
to be an excess of foreign exchange in circulation, except
perhaps for short transitional periods, since it can normally be
invested abroad for a return.  An excess or shortage may result
in banks selling/buying foreign exchange from the central
bank, which will in turn affect domestic currency liquidity, and
possibly also the exchange rate.  However, to the extent the
financial sector is inefficient, the transactional costs of
investing foreign exchange abroad may be excessive,
encouraging — at the margin — any excess holdings to be
spent domestically.  They would then have much the same
impact as excess holdings of domestic currency.
Some countries have found that, if the exchange rate
appreciates and is expected to continue appreciating, then
demand for domestic currency, non-interest-bearing
liabilities of the central bank will increase temporarily, as
people expect to benefit the exchange rate gain;  but once the
exchange rate is perceived to have stabilised, this will unwind.
In an under-banked economy, the easiest (or only) way of
(1) If banks judge that it will be impossible to get rid of the excess, their behaviour will be
affected in a different way — this will be explored later.
(2) It will also impact the transmission mechanism.  Changes in interest rates may affect
the balance between consumption (transactions money) and saving (bank deposits) if
enough people hold bank deposits;  but cannot influence directly those who use only
cash.  The level of savings held in the form of cash under the mattress (as opposed to
bank deposit) should be influenced by the level of inflation or strength of the
exchange rate (high inflation encourages more hording of physical goods);  but this is
less under the central bank’s direct control.
(3) It is unlikely to be worthwhile asking individuals how much foreign currency cash they
hold, as they would be suspicious and have incentives to lie.  But shopkeepers might
be prepared to say what percentage of their purchases (from suppliers) and sales are
denominated and/or paid for in foreign currency.  Changes over time in the responses
would give an indication of changing levels of dollarisation.Handbook No. 27 Liquidity forecasting 9
taking a speculative position on the domestic currency may be
via holdings of physical cash.
Autonomous factors:  levels and changes
The factors which the central bank needs to forecast — those
which are not under its direct control — are often referred to
as ‘autonomous factors’.  For most central banks, the main
items are:
• cash in circulation;
• net government balances;  and
• net foreign assets (for some this will mean simply foreign
exchange reserves).
There may be others, such as the ‘float’ in the payment
system, which are important for some countries but not for
others.  Some items may be irregular.  For instance, profit
remittance to the government may happen twice a year;  or
foreign exchange inflows relating to a privatisation may affect
a few days around the time of the privatisation only;  but their
size means that account needs to be taken of them when they
happen;  and the forecast model should allow for their
inclusion as necessary.
As indicated earlier, excess reserves are a subset of free
reserves (and cash).  These are normally the residual in the
forecast;  it is necessary to forecast the other items of the
balance sheet, both assets and liabilities, in order to generate a
forecast for free reserves.  On the assumption that the central
bank has a reasonably accurate picture of its balance sheet for
a recent date (ideally close of business the previous day), it will
know the balances in commercial banks’ current accounts for a
date in the past.  This being the case, the central bank can in
practice forecast the changes to the main items, rather than
the levels themselves, since that will produce a forecast for
changes to free reserves.  The central bank can therefore
concentrate on forecasting the items which show the largest
fluctuations in value.
Clearly, if the central bank forecasts the levels, then changes
for the given period are a residual;  and if changes to the latest
balance sheet are forecast, the forecast future balance sheet is
a residual.  One implies the other.  Both approaches have
merit, and at different times, both may need to be used.
Assume that cash in circulation today is 100, and is forecast to
increase by 0.5% tomorrow, to 100.5.  If the figure for today is
revised to 100.3, does this mean that some of the increase in
demand for tomorrow has happened early, in which case the
forecast level is not altered but the change is?  Or should the
forecast level be increased on the basis of a higher base
number and unchanged forecast increase?  Depending on the
circumstances, either could be right.  Similarly, assume that
the level of government balances is revised up for today.  That
might increase the level forecast for tomorrow, for a given
income and expenditure forecast;  or it might imply a different
change, if the government targets a particular balance held at
the central bank.
These factors may be stated in terms of levels (eg the level of
foreign exchange reserves) or in terms of flows (changes to the
level of net foreign exchange reserves).  In practice, the latter
may be more useful, since the central bank normally wants to
forecast changes in the residual item, commercial banks’ free
reserves.  It is important to remember that the forecast needs
to cover items which affect commercial bank liquidity.  A
change in the exchange rate will lead to a revaluation of
foreign exchange reserves, with a counterpart in a ‘revaluation
reserve’;  but these offset each other, and do not impact on
commercial bank liquidity.
What period should be forecast?
For the purposes of liquidity management, the central bank
ideally needs to undertake a daily forecast for coming few
weeks — certainly until the end of the current reserve
maintenance period.  If daily data is not available — as is the
case in a number of central banks — a weekly forecast might
need to be used instead, until data availability can be
improved.  But if the central bank’s monetary instruments
include longer-term operations — with a maturity of several
months, perhaps — then there is a good case for producing a
rough forecast of the central bank’s balance sheet for the next
few months, in order to provide a context for those
longer-term operations.  And for some central banks, there is
merit in occasionally projecting the balance sheet out for
several years, for instance to help answer the question:  if the
current structure of operations continues for the next five
years, what will the balance sheet look like based on
assumptions for the yield curve and the exchange rate?  Is the
current stance sustainable?(1)
A central bank must undertake a short-term forecast, if its
monetary operations are to be undertaken in a pro-active way:
otherwise, it would simply be guessing what to do in volume
terms.  But it should also make a longer-term forecast.  This is
in part as a check (if the long-term forecast and the short-term
forecast appear regularly and substantially out of line with
each other, is one wrong?  Are the same assumptions being
used?);  and for different aspects of operational planning.
The short-term forecast
There may be some interaction between the length of the
maintenance period, and the central bank’s ability to produce
an accurate forecast.  Some central banks find that they can
produce a reasonably accurate forecast for the two weeks or
(1) One Eastern European central bank defined these as:  for liquidity purposes, daily and
monthly;  for financial planning purposes, quarterly and annual;  and long term,
occasional eg looking forward seven years to estimate possible impact on the balance
sheet if/when it joins the euro.10 Handbook No. 27  Liquidity forecasting
month ahead, but cannot accurately split the forecast by each
day, or even week.  If this is the case, the maintenance period
could be set to match the period which the central bank can
best forecast.  A longer period than five weeks would be very
unusual, and might give the market too much freedom;  but if
extending from one or two weeks to four-five weeks would
allow for a significant improvement in liquidity management,
it should be considered.  That said, the central bank should
still aim to improve data and forecast quality to provide a
more accurate short-term picture of financial market
developments.
The short-term forecast needs to take account of the
commercial banks’ time horizon.  If there is a daily liquidity
constraint — as was the case in the United Kingdom prior to
May 2006, for instance — then an accurate forecast is needed
for the current day.  Most central banks will want to have
some idea of the forecast for the current day, if only to be
reasonably sure that reserve balances held by the commercial
banks are sufficient to be able to cope with expected cash
movements in the economy.
The next time horizon would normally be the period until the
next planned OMO.  For some central banks, this will be the
next day, and therefore a one-day forecast is sufficient (this is
also the period used by the Reserve Bank of Australia, where
there is no reserve maintenance period, though operations are
not necessarily undertaken every day).  For others, it may be a
one-week period — eg the Bank of England since May 2006,(1)
and the euro system.  The central bank might assume that the
commercial banks as a whole would like to end the system
with average reserves for the maintenance period roughly at
the target level, and to stay at that level for the remainder of
the maintenance period.  If this can be achieved, so that at the
start of a seven-day period the system has roughly the right
level of reserves, the question is:  what volume of liquidity
adjustment is needed to keep the banks on track for the
coming seven days?  Although in theory banks could move
substantially away from the target level for a few days, in
practice it is unlikely that they would want to do so.  If there
are one-off events, such as a securitisation or large payment
due to or from the government, which might lead the banks to
want to vary from the target average level, the central bank
will need to be aware of this and take it into account.
The third time horizon to consider is the period between today
and the end of the current maintenance period, which might
be one day, or could be up to one month.  The Bank of England
and the ECB publish daily information which shows the
average level of reserves held in the maintenance period to
date, and the average level required for the remainder of the
period if the banks are to hit the target (or mid-point of the
target, in the case of the United Kingdom) exactly.  This is
factual information rather than a forecast;  but taken together
with the forecast changes in autonomous factors indicates the
expected volume of OMO to be undertaken during the
remainder of the maintenance period.
Most central banks find it useful to end a reserves
maintenance period in the middle of the working week
(typically Wednesday or Thursday).  Certain of the
autonomous items — notably cash in circulation, and the float
(where relevant) are more volatile at the start and the end of
the working week, and therefore harder to forecast.  Ending
the maintenance period on a day which is easier to forecast
makes it more likely that the right amount of liquidity will be
provided.  If this is done, it also implies that maintenance
periods should be a whole number of weeks, rather than
eg a calendar month long.
For policy consistency purposes, it may also make sense to
align the start and end of maintenance periods with the day on
which the central bank reviews monetary policy (provided this
is on a regular schedule).  In the United Kingdom, the
maintenance period starts on the day the Monetary Policy
Committee announces its decision, and ends the day before
the next MPC meeting.  In the euro area, a similar alignment is
made between those Governing Council meetings which
review monetary policy, and the end of the maintenance
period.
Timeframe for long-term forecast
Beyond the current maintenance period, which constitutes a
constraint for banks’ liquidity management, a liquidity
forecast is used more for planning purposes than for specific
operations.
The longer-term forecasts may be useful in planning the
maturity structure of longer-term, price-taking OMOs.  Many
central banks, whether injecting or draining liquidity from the
economy, opt to place some of the transactions/part of their
balance sheet on a — maturity (up to fourteen days to
maturity), where they operate as price maker;  and other
transactions/part of their balance sheet at a much longer-term
maturity (possibly several years, but perhaps just several
months), where they operate as price taker.  When deciding
how much of the balance sheet should be placed at
longer-term maturities, and how long those maturities should
be, it will help to have some idea of how the balance sheet is
expected to develop in the future.
A longer-term forecast may also be useful if the central bank is
uncertain whether its current policy stance is sustainable.  This
is notably in the case with an exchange-rate target.  But this
form of forecast will be different to the short-term balance
sheet forecasting.  The central bank may want to estimate:
(1) The Bank of England’s Red Book, which describes the framework for monetary
operations, can be found at:
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/publications/redbookjan08.pdf.Handbook No. 27 Liquidity forecasting 11
• Likely growth in demand for domestic currency in coming
years:  this will be a function of GDP growth (including the
grey/black economy which may be a major user of cash
rather than formal banking channels), expected inflation,
any expected (de-)dollarisation, payment system
developments etc.
• Likely pressures on its foreign exchange reserves and the
exchange rate:  this will be a function of GDP growth, world
demand for the country’s exports, changes in
competitiveness, future repayments of foreign currency
borrowings etc.
• Possible changes in government behaviour eg if the
government has committed to ending monetary financing,
or is moving to a budget surplus, or moving cash balances
from commercial banks to the central bank as part of an
enhanced treasury-management function, or a change from
foreign currency to domestic borrowing.
This sort of forecast will use quarterly or even annual data, and
will not be concerned by within month, or maybe even within
year seasonality;  and it may benefit from a level of economic
analysis that cannot be used with some elements of the very
short-term forecast.
If the forecast is being used for monetary policy, rather than
liquidity management purposes — for instance, if the central
bank is using a monetary aggregate as its intermediate
monetary policy target — it will probably need to extend to at
least twelve months.  The central bank will normally only take
‘corrective’ action if the growth path of the targeted aggregate
is off-track over several months and this is expected to cause
problems for the final target of monetary policy.
Forecasting the autonomous factors
The items on the central bank balance sheet which need to be
forecast are often referred to as the ‘autonomous factors’.
These are the items normally understood to be beyond the
central bank’s direct control.  OMO clearly are within the
central bank’s control;  and use of SFs is normally forecast as
zero — though see discussion below.  Commercial banks’
current account balances is the residual item;  the forecast
needs to encompass everything else, though in practice it
could ignore items that lead to offsetting changes and which
do not impact banking sector liquidity (eg property revaluation
might change an asset item and ‘capital and reserves’ on the
liability side, but would make no difference to liquidity).  More
emphasis should, of course, be placed on forecasting items
which are likely to show large changes.  A large balance sheet
item which never changes will not impact liquidity;  and a very
small item which changes by small amounts will not have
much impact (though if there are  a lot of such items, the
cumulative effect could be significant).
For most central banks, the main three autonomous items
which need to be forecast are cash (= currency in issue);  net
government transactions;  and net foreign exchange
transactions.  These are explored in more detail below.
Cash
There is normally a strong seasonal component to cash in
circulation, even in countries with a developed financial
system, where most savings and most transactions — by value,
and in some cases by number — do not use cash (Chart 1
illustrates strong seasonal pattern for the United Kingdom).  In
most countries, supply always equals demand, as cash is issued
on demand, and central banks take back cash, via the banking
system, if there ever is a surplus due to seasonal factors.(1)
In a country with a developed financial system, the government
will make little direct use of cash.  Salaries for civil servants,
pensions etc are paid by direct credit to a banking account.  Any
subsequent demand for cash — as people withdraw part of
their salary (in some countries predominantly via ATMs if in
cash, though most expenditure may be in a non-cash form) —
will be subsumed into the cash demand management of the
commercial banks.  There is therefore no direct link in the
forecast between government salary disbursements and cash in
circulation;  there will instead be a net government expenditure
with a counterpart in commercial bank accounts at the central
bank (covered in a later section here).  If a significant part of
the population is finance-constrained, then a peak in cash
withdrawals may coincide with the payment of government
salaries and pensions.  The central bank would then need to
monitor whether this happened;  and if such a link changed
over time eg with a move to non-cash means of payment, or
with a reduction (or growth) in the finance-constrained
proportion of the population.












Source:  Bank of England.
Chart 1 Daily data for notes in circulation in the
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In countries with a less developed financial system, the
government may pay salaries, pensions etc predominantly in
cash.  The exact route may vary for the cash flows:  does the
government collect cash from the central bank and deliver it to
ministries etc?  Or is cash sent to commercial banks around
the country for disbursal?  In general, there will be a close
relationship between net government expenditure and cash in
circulation;  and no direct impact on commercial bank
balances at the central bank, to the extent the government
uses cash from the central bank, rather than bank accounts, to
make payments.  If the government starts to make use of
direct credits to bank accounts, the relationship will change;
but it may happen in stages over several months or even years
(the banking system needs to be given time to gear up to a
large increase in customers).  And there may be changes in
individuals’ behaviour.  In some countries, the first time a
salary is paid into an account rather than in cash, all of the
cash is withdrawn on day one.  The next month, the beneficiary
may only withdraw enough for a week or two.  Over time, the
individual may start to make use of non-cash payment
services, or savings accounts at the bank.  The transitional
phase, which may last for quite a long period, will make
forecasting harder.
In some countries, the government (and other groups) make
payment by cheque;  but the recipient encashes the cheque
immediately — in some cases at central bank counters.  Cash
flow management might be easier if the central bank did not
encash such cheques, but instead they had to be paid into
accounts at a commercial bank.  This might also encourage the
beneficiary to leave some of the cash in the bank (where they
can hold an account), whereas encashment at the central bank
requires the full amount to be taken in cash.  However, quick
results should not be expected.  For example, Ghana’s Cocoa
board has for some time made payments by cheque, but finds
that these are encashed very quickly.
In some countries, forecasting cash demand will be affected by
the level of dollarisation.  ‘Dollarisation’ does not mean
exclusively the use of US dollars outside the United States;  it
encompasses use of any non-domestic currency for
transactional purposes.  In some countries, there may be more
than one such currency.  The deutschemark, and subsequently
the euro, have been widely used at times in central European
countries which are not part of the euro area;  the South
African rand may be used in neighbouring countries.
Afghanistan currently sees use of the US dollar as well as the
Pakistani rupee and other currencies.(1)
Where a non-domestic currency is used as a substitute for the
domestic one, the demand for transactional cash will clearly
not be the same as the demand for domestic currency
transactional cash.  As long as the relationship between use of
domestic and foreign currency is stable, this may not be a
major problem.  But if the relationship changes, then it will be
harder to forecast demand for domestic currency.  The
relationship may change if there is de-dollarisation, for
instance if there is a growing level of confidence in the
domestic currency, or if it is expected to appreciate against
the dollar (or whatever the alternative currency is) in the near
future;  or it may change if there is an increase in the level of
dollarisation, for instance if there is a perception that central
bank behaviour may lead to an increase in inflation and
consequently a weakening of the exchange rate.  A process
which accurately forecasts the total demand for transactional
cash would not then give the right result for the domestic
currency component.  There is no simple answer to this
problem.  But it may make sense for the central bank to run
periodical surveys to try to estimate how much domestic and
foreign currency is being used — for instance, asking a
sample group of shop-keepers every month or quarter
roughly what percentage of transactions are denominated in
which currency.
Multiple seasonalities may also be a major issue in forecasting
a daily path for currency demand.  The four main factors which
need to be considered are:
Trend and cyclical growth
This may be in line with nominal GDP growth:  a neutral
assumption, in the absence of any other information, might be
that demand for cash would be a stable ratio of nominal GDP.
Or there might be a trend movement in the relationship
observable over time.  Increasing use of non-cash alternatives
for payments will affect the relationship.  Similarly, more
widespread availability of ATMs may reduce cash holdings, by
making it easier for users to replenish cash when needed.
Annual seasonality eg key festivals
Many countries find that there is increased demand for
currency around key festivals, as people typically spend more
money then.  Some may be picked up quite easily:  Christmas
always falls on 25 December (except in some Orthodox
countries), although it may be classed as a moving holiday
because it falls on a different day of the week each year.  Easter
may be in March or April;  and Ramadan is always earlier than
in the previous year because of the use of a lunar calendar for
its calculation.  Moveable feasts will require some
manipulation, as standard statistical programmes may not
cope well with them.
In other countries, there will be a strong seasonality related to
holiday periods:  tourists, or spending related to seasonal
remittances from abroad, may substantially increase the
demand for cash at peak times.
(1) Use of non-domestic currencies also adds a layer of complexity to the forecast for
note demand for those central banks who issue the notes used abroad, though not
normally on a very short-term basis.  The US Federal Reserve Bank has to take account
of demand for US banknotes (including by denomination) in many countries around
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Monthly seasonality
If government salaries, pensions etc are paid in cash, this may
lead to a monthly pattern for cash demand.  In some countries,
for instance, cash in circulation rises towards the end of each
month when salaries and/or pensions are paid, and then falls
gradually until the same point in the following month.
Weekly seasonality
Many countries find a clear weekly seasonality.  More cash is
withdrawn ahead of weekends, and returned to the central
bank — via shop tills and commercial banks — on the first
working day of the following week.  This is sometimes known
as the trading-day effect.  In some countries the pattern is very
strong;  and it will be influenced by public holidays.  Where
wages are paid weekly — typically on a Thursday or Friday —
this will also cause a weekly pattern in cash holding.  Again,
standard statistical analysis tools may not be able to cope well
with weekly patterns, which run across month and year ends.
But the central bank needs to forecast them.
Forecast judgement and adjustment
As well as this analytical approach to cash demand, the central
bank can also liaise with the major cash demanders (normally
commercial banks, or maybe cash-handling security firm
intermediaries) on their expected demand for cash over the
next few days.  The analytical forecast may indicate that there
will be no net demand for cash over the next two-three days,
but if all the major banks say they are sending lorries to collect
more, the forecast team needs to be aware of this.  A pooled
forecast — combining the statistical forecast with information
from note sorting and distribution centres — should be
expected on average to generate a more accurate forecast
than either of the individual inputs.
Denomination forecasting
The demand for cash forecast will clearly be of use not only to
the liquidity forecasting team, but to those responsible within
the central bank for the printing of  currency in circulation.
They will need to ensure that sufficient notes of the correct
denomination are printed and available to meet demand.
Theforecast for total demand, and the aggregation of the
forecasts for individual denominations, are likely to differ to
some extent.
Since this involves an industrial process, and for perhaps the
majority of central banks worldwide involves shipping in notes
from producers in other countries, some advance notice is
required.  But there is a cost to holding excess notes — storage
costs, security, the risk that a particular series may be
withdrawn from circulation before all stocks have been used —
so central banks cannot simply over-order massively in order
to avoid the risk of running short of notes.
Government transactions
Most central banks say that ‘net government transactions’ is
the hardest part of the forecast.  One central bank noted that
its Ministry of Finance published forecast income and
expenditure data on its website;  but the numbers were simply
unreliable.  Others say that their Ministry of Finance is
reluctant to release some data, claiming it to be confidential
(though in some cases at least this appears to be code for ‘We
don’t know either!’).
In some cases, what the central bank needs to know, and the
way in which the Ministry of Finance views data, may be rather
different.  The Ministry cares most about the budget balance,
while the central bank cares about its liquidity impact (and of
course any impact on demand and thus inflation).  The
Ministry of Finance may make use of commercial banks —
whether state-owned or private sector — for substantial parts
of its net transactions.  This mixes transactions across the
books of the central bank, which do impact liquidity, with
other transactions which do not.  If this is the case, then the
central bank will need to persuade the Ministry of Finance that
it is worth making some effort to obtain data in the form
useful to the central bank.  It might argue, for instance, that
improvements in cash management by the Ministry of Finance
will not only help to stabilise short-term interest rates and
support financial market development (with spin-off benefits
for the government if it borrows in domestic markets), but that
it should also allow direct savings to the Ministry of Finance as
it can then manage its funds more effectively.
Economic models may be useful in helping to forecast the
government’s budget flows on an annual basis, but cannot
provide the short-term cash-flow forecasts needed for liquidity
management.(1) However, the short-term projections of cash
flow should be compared against the annual profile:  they
should give broadly the same picture over time.(2)
In general, expenditure is often easier to forecast than income,
as it relies more on official decisions.  A government
department may decide on a particular expenditure and
negotiate prices and payment dates — for instance, for a fleet
of new ambulances, or for upgraded IT equipment, or
additional teachers — and should have a good idea about how
much will be spent, and when.  But receipts against corporate
income tax or duties on tobacco will reflect the aggregate total
of company profits in the relevant period, or of the spending
(or smoking) decisions of large numbers of people.
It may also be the case that the path for expenditure is
smoother (less volatile) than that for income, and so easier
toforecast.
(1) Even on an annual basis, some elements may prove hard to model.  For instance,
companies paying corporation tax may be able to offset past profits and interest
payments against their taxable profits, reducing the aggregate tax yield;  and the
impact of these factors will vary through the economic cycle.
(2) These issues are covered in an article by Mike Williams which can be found at
www.mj-w.net/pdfs/ForecastingUKCashFlows.pdf.  His site also contains a useful note
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Chart 2 tracks, on a monthly basis, UK government income
and expenditure over a 4.5 year period.  It is clear that the
expenditure path is much smoother than that for income;
though the seasonality of income items is probably easier to
spot, with regular troughs and peaks.  A central bank will
want data with a higher frequency than monthly;  but
monthly is much better than nothing, and it may be possible
to estimate a reasonable monthly pattern based on published
data alone, or using data of transactions across accounts at
the central bank.
The pattern of a smoother expenditure path than that for
income holds is probably fairly general, though not universal.
Charts 3 and 4 show much more volatile income patterns,
but also a strong — and so reasonably predictable —
seasonality.
In some cases, the pattern of expenditure and income appears
less stable, but the net figure may nevertheless be relatively
stable and predictable (see for example Chart 5).  If it is the
net figure that impacts the central bank’s balance sheet — this
will depend on whether all flows go through the central bank’s
books, and how the government manages the cash flow
differences — then the central bank may be able to obtain
useful information to support its liquidity forecast even in the
absence of a precise forecast for the components of
government transactions.
On the expenditure side, some items should be quite easy for
the government to forecast.  This is notably the case with
staffing and pensions, since each department ought to have
good records of how many staff it employs and at what salary
levels;  and the day of the month of salary payments are
normally pre-determined.(1) Information on normal salary
payment dates will allow a within month pattern to be
imposed on monthly payment flows.
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Source:  Thomson Datastream.
Chart 5 Italy — seasonal patterns in net government
income
(1) Though one West African central bank suggested that many staff would be happy to
be paid in the right month, let alone on the correct date.Handbook No. 27 Liquidity forecasting 15
Expenditure on major one-off items should also be known
reasonably accurately some weeks in advance, and accurately
at least a few days in advance.  It should be possible to instruct
ministers and senior civil servants that authorisation of any
payment above a certain level (X million currency units, or Y%
of the budget) must be pre-notified to the Ministry of Finance
treasury management unit.  It may even be that such
pre-notification is already required for budget management
purposes, and what is needed is simply to copy the
information to the Ministry of Finance treasury/cash
management unit.
If, for example, wages and salaries (including civil servants,
hospital staff, military, pensioners and teachers) account for
60% of expected payments;  and large one-off payments on
known dates are expected to account for another 10%, then
the forecast could start with the total monthly expenditure
(using a known seasonal pattern(1) and budget data);  input
estimates for salaries and one-off payments on the known
dates;  and spread the remaining payments evenly —
eg around 1.5% of total monthly expenditure on each working
day of the month.  For a given two or four week reserves
maintenance period, this may be reasonably accurate.
On the income side, accurate forecasts may be harder.  But as
indicated above, there may be some key dates and/or strong
seasonality that can be used to help.  For instance, corporate
tax in many countries is due on a certain date each quarter.
Income tax due from individuals may be received (or at least
due) on a particular day of the month.  The central bank might
observe from examination of the relevant government
accounts held at the central bank that X% of the expected
income is usually paid on those dates, and that Y% is normally
spread over the following few days.  Economic development
since the last budget might lead the central bank to adjust
the total expected tax payments for the relevant period.  This
will assist it in converting a budget forecast for quarterly
corporate tax income into a cash flow forecast for specific days
in the future.
As with expenditure items, large income flows expected on
particular dates can be entered into the forecast, and other
flows spread evenly through the forecast period.
The ECB publishes on its website some institutional
arrangements by country — see Annex 3 for an example of
this.  This indicates that in some countries government net
flows across the books of the central bank do not cause any
forecast problems,(2) while in others they can be both large
and hard to forecast.  To a large extent this will depend on
institutional arrangements.  For instance, if the government
uses commercial banks for the majority of its banking
transactions, both for holding cash balances and for making
payments, these flows will not impact market liquidity and so
do not need to be captured by the forecast.  Such a practice
does give rise to potentially tricky issues for the government,
but can make the liquidity forecast easier.  Issues include:
• Should the government use all commercial banks, or just a
few?  How does it choose?  If it stopped using a particular
bank because of concerns about creditworthiness, could this
cause the bank to collapse?
• If there are state-owned banks, or dominant banks in
general, should the government use the state-owned and/or
large banks, which are possibly the strongest and have the
largest branch network;  or would this preserve their
dominance and so prevent a growth in competition?
• Should the government ask for collateral if it is keeping large
balances with commercial banks;  and if it does so, how
might this impact secondary market liquidity for eligible
assets?
Some central banks set a limit either on the government’s
balance with the central bank, or on short-term fluctuations in
the balance eg France and Poland (Chart 6).
The UK government tasked its Debt Management Office with
cash management as well, from 2000 (see Annex 4).  Cash
management is distinct from (longer-term) debt management,
in that the former is necessary even if the government has a
balanced budget and no debt (since income and expenditure
will not be matched on a daily basis);  while the latter need
not be affected by short-term uncertainties in cash flow, but
instead is driven by longer-term budget planning.  Cash
management is a treasury function, and still requires an
accurate and timely forecast of government flows to be
(1) The seasonality for salaries and pensions may be different to that for other items.  If
the two can be split out, this should allow for a more accurate forecast.
(2) In some cases this is because the flows are small, with most government transactions
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Chart 6 Poland — government deposits at the
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produced, as well as some form of dealing-room transactions
to manage cash on both a very short-term and on a
medium-term basis.  But when conducted effectively, it
means that the government net transactions across the
books of the central bank are very small on a day-by-day
basis. This substantially facilitates the central bank’s task of
liquidity management.
Government guarantees
Some governments find it hard to forecast cash flows relating
to guarantees given to local government, state-owned
enterprises or other state-supported bodies.  This raises three
issues:
• If the government is fully guaranteeing a loan by another
state body, it may make more sense for the government to
borrow from the markets, and on-lend as necessary to that
state body.  By reducing the number of issuers, and bringing
the borrowing into the ambit of the government’s overall
debt management strategy, total borrowing costs should be
reduced and market liquidity improved.
• If central government, or government departments, do give
guarantees, it is essential that proper procedures are
followed.  This would include:  guarantees only to be given
by duly authorised bodies, and following agreed procedures;
and information on such guarantees to be reported to the
Ministry of Finance so that central government has unified
and complete data on the amounts and timing of any
payments guaranteed.
• On an ongoing basis, regular (eg quarterly) reporting should
be provided on financial developments by any body which
has received a guarantee, so that central government is not
caught by surprise if a guarantee is called;  and adhoc
reporting by any body in receipt of a guarantee if there is a
deterioration in its financial position which might lead to the
guarantee being called.
In some countries where government guarantees are given,
none of the above holds true.  The Ministry of Finance may
need to be pro-active in seeking out information, in
establishing proper procedures, and possibly in refusing to
cover any ‘guarantee’ which has not been properly authorised
(this would give an incentive to lenders to be more cautious,
and to ensure that central government was kept informed).
Guarantees may be given for foreign exchange loans rather
than domestic currency.  This could lead to unexpected
changes in net foreign exchange assets as well as government
balances;  but may mean there is no impact on domestic
currency liquidity held by commercial banks (the fall in net
foreign exchange assets could be offset by a reduction in the
government’s deposit at the central bank).
Net foreign assets
If the central bank’s exchange rate policy is genuinely for a free
floating rate, the forecast for net foreign exchange transactions
may be close to zero.  The central bank will make occasional
foreign exchange transactions on behalf of the government
and other customers, but otherwise may not need to buy or
sell foreign exchange.  However, this situation is relatively
unusual in practice.
If the central bank operates a T + 2 settlement for foreign
exchange transactions, at least the very short-term forecast
should be easy, since it will have two days’ notice of a
transaction before it impacts on domestic currency liquidity.
Some differentiation may be possible:  the central bank could
adopt a policy of T + 2 settlement as a rule;  but allow or insist
on T + 0 (if settlement issues do not prevent) for SFs using
foreign exchange, or fine-tuning OMO (where the central bank
particularly wants to impact liquidity conditions today).
If the central bank has an exchange rate target, it may have
little control over foreign exchange transactions, at least in the
short term, although it may be able to forecast a trend.  This
relates to an important difference, from the point of view of
liquidity management, between using an interest rate and an
exchange rate tactical target.  In the former case, the central
bank can change the price/interest rate without needing to
vary the volume of injection/withdrawal of domestic liquidity;
but in the latter case it may need to vary the volume
bought/sold in order to achieve the price target.  This point is
illustrated in Chart 7, showing the volume of US dollars sold
by the Central Bank of Iraq in its daily foreign exchange
auction.(1) There is clearly some seasonality in demand
eg ahead of Ramadan.  Increased consumption during
Ramadan has an impact on net imports (to the extent
consumption goods are imported) and thus on demand for
foreign exchange.  (There will also be an associated seasonality
in cash demand.)
More strikingly, in the last two months of 2006, when the
central bank tightened monetary policy by appreciating the
dinar by around 10% against the US dollars, the volume of
sales reacted very strongly.  The broad direction of the reaction
was predictable:  while the currency was appreciating, banks
and their customers would want to hold on to dinar balances
for as long as possible, in the expectation of buying US dollars
more cheaply later on;  and once the expected appreciation
was largely complete, they would unwind their positions —
so the volume of net sales fell sharply until the appreciation
was largely complete, and then rose above longer-term trend
levels for a period.  But it seems unlikely that the central bank
could have maintained the exchange rate ahead of Ramadan
without varying the volume of its sales in line with market
(1) The origins of the CBI’s foreign exchange auction are described in ‘A new currency for
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demand, or that it could have engineered an appreciation of
the exchange rate without prompting a change in the volume
of market demand.
From the point of view of liquidity management, this meant
that the policy of currency appreciation resulted in large
changes in domestic currency liquidity;  whereas a parallel
policy of increasing official interest rates would not necessarily
have any impact on liquidity.
In the short term, this need not be a problem.  While domestic
currency liquidity may increase in a way that is not fully
predictable, if it is increasing because of a change in demand, it
may be reasonable to assume that the two offset each other.
The change in domestic currency balances does not necessarily
imply a change in the volume of excess liquidity.  Even if in
general the central bank’s balance sheet is asset driven, the
particular case described above reflects a liability-driven
change.  In the short term at least, this may not require a
central bank response.
If there is strong exchange rate pressure, it will be impossible
for the central bank to forecast future purchases or sales
accurately:  the market is too unpredictable in times of stress.
But under normal conditions — for instance, the first four
months transactions in Chart 7 — the central bank may be
able to forecast reasonably accurately the market’s net
demand for foreign exchange.  It will not be able to do so on a
daily basis, since there are too many factors that affect very
short-term demand.  But it may observe trends in market
demand.  For instance, it may find that there are regular
seasonal patterns.  In some countries, imports rise ahead of
key festivals, and this will impact the timing of demand.  In
others, export receipts for major items may be remitted on
certain known days;  or there may be a seasonal pattern to
sales.(1) If the central bank can detect seasonal patterns, and
impose these on underlying trends in demand, it may obtain a
reasonably accurate monthly forecast for net foreign exchange
demand.  In some cases, liaison with commodity exporting
bodies (in many countries, commodity exports are handled by
a centralised institution) may provide the central bank with
useful information on the likely timing of future flows.
It will also be useful for the central bank to understand what
drives imports.  To the extent that marginal imports are a
response to changes in export earnings, then whether exports
increase or decrease, the net demand for foreign exchange may
be stable over time.  The central bank will need to understand
the lags involved — for instance, 75% of an increase in export
revenues may feed though to import demand from one to
three months later.  Timely information on exports will help to
forecast changes in net foreign exchange assets in coming
months.  But it is also possible that imports may be funded by
bank borrowing.  In this case, changes in bank lending may be
a lead indicator of changes in imports, and thus in the market’s
demand for foreign exchange.
One might conclude that if foreign exchange operations are
intended to influence the exchange rate, the price is (more or
less) under the control of the central bank, but the volume will
be determined by the market.  They should therefore be
treated as an autonomous item in the liquidity forecast.  But if
the transaction is not expected to influence the exchange rate,
the volume is more likely to be controllable by the central
bank, and should therefore be grouped with monetary
operations — whether OMO or SF — in the liquidity forecast.
Examples of this type of operation would include:
• The Bank of Mexico regularly sells foreign exchange, in order
to reduce the rate of growth of its foreign exchange reserves
and the counterpart increase in domestic liquidity.  The
volume of sales is determined by net purchases of foreign
exchange in preceding quarters, and the daily volume to be
sold over the coming month is pre-announced.  As the policy
is clear and the volumes pre-announced, and because the
market is deep, the actual sales do not impact the market
exchange rate;  and the volume is fully controlled by the
central bank.
• Foreign exchange swaps are used by a number of central
banks.  Their usefulness will vary depending on whether
there is a surplus or a deficit of liquidity in the market, and
on the level (if any) of dollarisation in the economy.  But
since they do not affect the underlying exposure of the
market to foreign exchange, they should not affect the
market exchange rate.
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Source:  Central Bank of Iraq website.
(1) Weather will affect seasonal demand for oil and gas, and thus revenue for
export/expenditure on import.  Some crops have a clear season eg coffee beans;
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Float
‘Households and businesses make a significant portion of their
payments by writing checks on their accounts at (banks). The
Federal Reserve’s national check clearing system facilitates the
movement of these checks around the country. The Reserve
Banks credit a bank’s reserve account at the Fed for checks
deposited — presented for collection —  by the bank and debit
its account for checks drawn on it and presented by other
banks. When a presenting bank’s reserve account is credited
before a corresponding debit is made to the account of the
bank on which the check is drawn,two banks have credit
simultaneously for the same reserves,creating reserve float.
This float arises because Reserve Banks credit checks presented
for collection,under a preset schedule,to a bank’s reserve
account …,while it sometimes takes (longer) to process those
checks and collect funds from the banks on which they are
drawn.’(1)
For some central banks, the size of the float is important;  and
it may vary because of seasonal factors:
• More cheques will be written at times of higher expenditure
eg ahead of key festivals, notably Christmas;  and higher
volumes can increase processing delays.
• More cheques are likely to be banked on the first or second
working day of the week (it may take a day for cheques to
paid in to commercial bank branches and then passed on to
the cheque clearing centre):  higher volumes can increase
processing delays.
• Where cheque clearing involves the physical transportation
of pieces of paper, bad weather may cause transport delays
and so increase the float.
The Fed has introduced certain incentives to discourage banks
from increasing the float deliberately;  more information can
be found on the Fed’s website.
For a given size of float, it is possible that unexpected
payments towards the end of the day could cause problems for
individual banks in managing their liquidity, with an impact on
the assessment of the overall position of the market.  In the
United Kingdom and many other countries, cheques (and ACH
type(2) payment) transfers involve a large number of relatively
low-value payments.  The net daily debit or credit position is
normally small compared to the overall payment flows
managed by banks.  Large payments are made via the Real
Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system.  But if banks are
allowed to, or do, make large-value payments by cheque;  and
if cheques can be paid in late in the day;  then a small bank
may find itself the recipient of a large credit on its central bank
account too late in the day to re-channel the money to the
market.  One central bank noted that a small bank can find
that the size of credits from late, large cheque payments can
lead to a commercial bank exceeding its reserve target the
whole maintenance period well before the end of that
period.(3) The central bank has to take account of this when
forecasting the overall demand for reserves.
The question of the float does not arise in all countries:  the
structure of the payment system may make it irrelevant.  For
example, in the United Kingdom, cheque clearing is handled by
the commercial banks, and the clearing system reports net
debit and credit positions to the Bank of England each day.
Since these always sum to zero (one bank’s credit is another
bank’s debit), no float is created when the net payments are
effected across the central bank’s books.
Taking account of known transactions
Some transactions are known in advance, and do not need to
be forecast;  but they do impact liquidity and so must be
included.  These are:
• The unwinding of any past OMO or SF transactions.  If the
central bank lends funds to the market for two weeks, it
knows exactly when the repayment is due, and how much it
will be.  Or it if drains liquidity by issuing a 182 day bill, it
knows exactly what the repayment will be.  These should be
included separately to future OMO — that is, OMO
undertaken in response to the current forecast — in order to
avoid any confusion.
• Repayments of interest and principal on any government
securities held by the central bank.  These will appear twice
in the forecast:  they will (or at least should) be part of the
forecast of government net transactions, where they will
reduce the balance in the government’s account at the
central bank.  Principal repayments will also reduce central
bank assets (the balance sheet shrinks), while interest
payments will increase P&L, on the liability side (the balance
sheet does not shrink).
• Any dividends or other profit remittance to the government.
These will be infrequent, but could be substantial when they
happen.  The forecast must include them;  and a mechanism
may need to be in place to ensure that irregular, infrequent
payments such as these are not forgotten.
Forecasting demand for liquidity
It was suggested earlier that if banks hold either too much or
too little liquidity, they will respond in a way which may be
detrimental to the central bank’s goals.  The definition of the
‘right’ level of liquidity needs to take account of any reserve
(1) Taken from a US Federal Reserve Bank paper on reserves management.  More
information on the float in the United States can be found on the New York Federal
Reserve Bank website at:  www.newyorkfed.org.
(2) ACH:  Automated Clearing House — a system used to clear bulk retail payments.
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requirement set by the central bank (and perhaps also of any
liquidity ratios imposed by banking supervisors, which may be
a different part of the central bank, or a different institution
altogether as in the United Kingdom);  and also of the banks’
demand for liquidity.  One African central bank (with a reserve
money target) noted that while their calculations showed the
banking system to have excess liquidity, the banks themselves
said they were short.  If the central bank wishes to avoid spikes
in interest rates which result from short-term fluctuations in
demand, it is in most cases essential that bank demandfor
liquidity be understood and forecasted, as well as the
autonomous (‘supply’) factors.
It is important to bear in mind that the trade-off which banks
may make between the cost of holding liquidity and the
benefits of having it (less risk of paying penal rates for
emergency borrowing etc) may not be the same as that of the
central bank.
In the euro area, banks have to meet a reserve requirement of
2% of liabilities, on average over a one-month period.  This
represents far more liquidity than the banking system needs
for payments purposes, and the ECB can therefore assume that
on virtually all occasions banks will want to meet the
requirement (because there are penalties for failing to do so),
but will not demand additional liquidity.
Chart 8 shows the daily level of reserves in the euro system
compared with the target level, for 2004.  The vertical lines
indicate new maintenance periods.  It can be seen that the
actual level of reserves on any day rarely diverges by more
than 10% (ie 20 basis points of the 200 basis point target)
from the target average level.  The red line is a moving
average of reserve holdings, and illustrates that average
reserves are always very close to target by the end of each
maintenance period.(1)
If the level of reserves held voluntarily exceeds any reserve
requirement, then it will clearly not be sufficient to provide
enough liquidity to meet the requirement exactly:  demand
has to be forecast.  This is true of the United States, where
reserve requirements are not a binding constraint on many
banks;  and of Australia and Canada, where there are no
reserve requirements.  In the United States, reserve
requirements and additional working balances are not
remunerated(2) (this may change from 2011), and banks
have an incentive to hold balances as low as possible, an
incentive which increases as official rates rise and vice versa:
‘Historically,both reserve requirements and clearing balance
requirements have tended to move inversely with short-term
interest rates…A decline in total requirements challenges
banks by limiting their flexibility in distributing balance
holdings over a maintenance period consistent with meeting
their total requirements over a maintenance period.
Experience suggests that there is some level of aggregate
balances necessary to maintain liquidity in the reserves
markets. As the amount of available balances falls below this
level,the risks of a spike in fed funds rates in late-day trading
and sizable borrowing from the discount window increases
significantly.’ (Domestic open market operations during 2006,
FRB,New York February 2007.)
Note that ‘as low as possible’ will have a different meaning
for commercial banks and the central bank.  For the former,
the goal is to minimise the cost of holding sufficient balances
to meet payment orders.  For the latter, the goal is to provide
sufficient liquidity to avoid disruption to the payment system
and to keep short-term rates stable at or close to the policy
rate (where this exists).
There may be an average amount of liquidity demanded by
the market, which will be influenced by seasonal factors.
But there will also be certain individual days when more
liquidity is demanded, for instance if there are large tax
payments due, or a large transaction (a securitisation, or a
bond launch), or around certain month ends when banks want
to be able to present larger liquid balances on their balance
sheets;  or simply a large volume of payments — eg around
Christmas — when payments flow uncertainty is higher for
individual banks.  There is some evidence that the so-called
‘martingale’ property, which assumes that arbitrage will make
banks indifferent between a holding of reserves on any given
(1) Reserve balances in the euro area are normally a fraction of a per cent above target, as
many small banks in particular find it more cost effective to hold some excess
reserves, than to set up the systems that would be required to manage them more
exactly.  The same phenomenon is observable in the United States, where excess
reserves, held mostly by small banks, run at around US$1.5 billion.
(2) Working balances above reserve requirements (‘contractual clearing balances’) gain
credits which can be used to pay for services provided by the Federal Reserve system;
but this is significantly less than the cost of holding such funds, especially if official
rates rise.
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day of a reserve maintenance period, does not hold in
practice.(1)
In Australia, as (voluntarily held) reserves balances are
remunerated at 25 basis points below the policy rate, banks
are willing to hold a certain level of reserves — the cost of
holding is much lower than in the United States — and on
most days, the voluntarily held level of liquidity is sufficient.
But there are some days when demand increases — for the
same reasons as in the United States — and the Reserve Bank
needs to be aware of these in order to supply the additional
liquidity and avoid spikes in rates.  This sort of forecast
requires some general knowledge — it may be observed that at
certain times of year the demand for reserves is higher/lower
than average;  but also specific information from the market
about its needs on particular days, some of which may be
one-off.  The central bank needs to talk to the market to obtain
this information.
Where there is excess liquidity, and the central bank does not
drain it all — so that very short-term market rates tend to
hover around the deposit SF rate (or zero, if there is no
deposit SF) — it may be tempting to assume that the banks
will always have enough liquidity.  This may be correct on most
occasions, but not on all.  There is a benefit to the central bank
in trying to forecast the occasions of shortage, especially when
the credit SF is viewed as expensive (in some markets it is
several percentage points above the ‘policy’ rate, and even
further above short-term market rates).  If some banks try to
avoid any need of access to the SF, they may hold on to excess,
precautionary reserves rather than lending them to other
banks even when there is demand.  This would particularly be
the case for banks which do not hold a substantial volume of
assets eligible for use in the central bank’s credit SF (perhaps
because the list of eligible assets is narrow;  or liquid asset
requirements mean banks cannot dispose of them freely).  This
will inhibit proper functioning of the market and can damage
financial sector development, and points to a benefit of
forecasting peak liquidity demand even under conditions of
generalised surplus.
In both cases — a shortage of liquidity and non-binding
reserves;  or a surplus of liquidity — the banks could
presumably choose to target higher levels of liquidity holdings
overall.  But they may judge that the overall cost of holding
extra balances which would rarely be needed exceeds the cost
of having to access the market or SF borrowing on the rare
occasions of need.  If the central bank wishes to avoid spikes in
market rates around these — often very short-lived —
occasions of higher need, they have to be able to forecast
them, and also to have the tools to respond to them.
Improving the quality of forecasts
Good data
Central banks are continuously striving to improve the quality
of their forecasts.  Depending on the starting point, this may
involve:
• Obtaining accurate base data:  is the central bank’s balance
sheet available daily?  Weekly?  Only monthly with a lag?
If the forecasters do not have an accurate and up-to-date
starting point, it will be harder to produce an accurate
estimate of future changes.  In some countries the lag in
producing balance sheet data can be several days, or longer.
This does not mean that the forecast team needs to wait
that long before having an idea of what is happening.  It is
normally possible to obtain reliable data for certain balance
sheet items early — commercial bank balances, government
balances, changes in foreign exchange balances.(2) In some
countries, there is a lag in obtaining full data from all of the
central bank’s branches.  Can Head Office data be used as a
proxy?  An analysis of past relationships between Head
Office and total data will give an indication of this.
• Some data may be available within the central bank, but not
necessarily available to the department producing the
liquidity forecast.  It is important that available data be
disseminated quickly.
• Rigorous analysis of errors on as detailed and precise a basis
as possible is an important part of the forecast process.  As
with inflation projections, it is more likely than not that the
forecast will be inaccurate:  the task is to start with what is
possible and aim to improve.  If the reasons for inaccuracies
can be understood, this should help to correct them.  If the
reasons are not clear, it may still be possible to identify if
there is a standard bias, and make allowances for this.  It can
also be useful to the operational team to know how accurate
forecasts tend to be:  is the forecast for a surplus of
100 million currency units accurate within 5 million, or is it
really for a surplus of anything between 70–130 million?
This may affect the decision on maturity of operations.  For
example, the uncertain element could be drained on a
short-term basis, rather than a long-term drain which might
need to be unwound if the forecast is inaccurate.
• Where cash is important, regular surveys of behaviour of
users might help in understanding trend changes, for
(1) For instance, Hamilton (1996), The daily market for federal funds.  There is
‘overwhelming evidence against the hypothesis that the federal funds rate follows a
martingale over the two-week reserve maintenance period, establishing that banks do
not regard reserves held on different days of the week to be perfect substitutes’.
See also Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (1999), Banks’ reserves management,transaction
costs and the timing of Federal Reserve intervention.
(2) It may be easier to obtain data for net foreign exchange sales — flow data, which the
dealers should know same day — than a full revaluation of net foreign exchange
assets (stock data);  but as it is the flow which impacts on liquidity, this is all that is
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instance in de-dollarisation, or changes from use of cash to
non-cash alternative means of payments (cheques, direct
credits etc).
• In the United Kingdom, HMTreasury uses financial incentives
to encourage major departments to produce an accurate
forecast.  If the department’s cash-flow forecast — measured
on a daily basis — falls outside pre-determined margins of
error, the department is fined.  Money collected from the
fines is distributed back to departments, benefiting those
which produce a more accurate forecast.  The size of the fine
relates to the notional cost to the cash management team
of such errors.
The forecast team
How many people should be involved, and with what skill
sets?  Directly or indirectly, a large number of people will be
involved in the forecast.  For instance, if a good forecast of net
government transactions is to be obtained, reporting will be
required at many different levels of all departments.  Many
people in the banking and accounting departments of the
central bank may also have some input.  But for most of these
people, the forecast is not a full-time or major role.
As a minimum, pulling together the various strands of data,
checking them and keeping them up to date, could be a major
role for at least one person, with ideally a fully-trained backup.
How many are needed in the team will depend in part of the
importance of the various autonomous factors and the need to
forecast demand for liquidity.  A regular second member of the
forecast ‘team’ is also helpful in ensuring that the forecast
data are checked.  If a lot of data are being assembled, it is
always possible that an incorrect number will be entered
(‘straight-through’ processing of all input data is unlikely), or
that a number might be omitted or entered with the wrong
sign.  Having someone available to check the data, albeit
quickly, can help to pick up such errors.
Cash demand could be estimated very simply, with a
spreadsheet-based extrapolation of past data, assuming the
same weekly and seasonal patterns.  But if the cash forecast is
an important part of the forecast — for instance, if changes in
cash demand constitute a significant proportion of the net
liquidity fluctuations — then a much more sophisticated
approach could be taken.  This might require an additional
person, and that person would need strong mathematical
skills.  Even with very well-established and clear procedures,
errors will arise.  For example, with cash forecasting the two
main errors are wrong input data (wrong size and sign) and
failure to check the pattern.  These errors are most likely to
arise if the job of forecasting cash becomes routine and
concentration weakens.  If the forecast is run by junior staff, it
must be checked and signed off by senior staff to reduce the
risk of such errors.
If the government is persuaded of the benefits of liquidity
management, it may devote a number of its staff to
forecasting its own cash flows.  In the United Kingdom, a team
in the Ministry of Finance co-ordinates information with staff
in all of the major spending ministries, on a daily basis, in order
to elaborate a reliable forecast.  Altogether, perhaps
20–30 people might be involved as a substantial part of their
job.  This in itself is important:  people are more likely to
prioritise their key responsibilities than to give time and energy
to minor tasks which have been added on and in which their
own management takes little interest.  The United Kingdom
has also devised a system of rewarding departments which
produce an accurate forecast, and penalising those who do
not, as a further incentive to accuracy.  Some of these people
will need to have a good grasp of accounting and budget
procedures;  all will need to be good enough with numbers to
be reliably accurate.  But if the Ministry of Finance does not
provide reliable forecast data, the central bank may need to
make its own estimates, based on published budget data and
detailed daily information available from the Ministry’s
accounts at the central bank.
Net foreign exchange movements may require some input
from foreign exchange dealers.  It is unlikely that a daily
forecast could be elaborated in as sophisticated a way as cash
forecasting:  short-term fluctuations in wholesale demand for
foreign exchange — which depend on a wide range of different
factors — could easily swamp the more regular pattern of
retail demand.  But some mathematical analysis of market
demand could be conducted, requiring the appropriate
amount of time and technical skill;  and it may be possible to
identify longer-term trends and seasonality, and links to the
forecast level of economic activity (which the central bank will
be forecasting for other purposes).  Likewise, forecasting the
cash float, in counties where this is important, will require
some technical skills in picking out clear seasonal patterns, and
knowing how to make adjustments for public holidays,
weather etc.
If a longer-term forecast is to be undertaken, whether for
monetary policy purposes, or to estimate what the balance
sheet might look like in twelve months time or more, a
different level of skills — macroeconomic forecasting skills, in
particular — may be required.  Building such behavioural
models is data intensive.
Finally, it will be useful, if not essential, if some people in the
forecast team are outgoing and good communicators.  Much
of the forecast relies on obtaining good and timely data from
other departments, from government ministries and from
commercial banks.  Someone with good people skills is likely
to be more successful than a different person who is
non-communicative, unthankful or even rude!22 Handbook No. 27  Liquidity forecasting
Where in the central bank should the forecast team be
located?
Is the forecast a job for the operational desk, or banking
department, or research?  Practice varies among central banks.
Some have chosen to move the function of the daily liquidity
forecast into the markets/operational area of the bank, as this
is the area which uses the information.  It seems reasonable
that the area which uses it should be able to decide how the
forecast is structured, and what level of resources to devote to
it.  For instance, the operational area may benefit from
employing a skilled mathematician to improve the
cash-demand forecast;  but if another part of the bank is
responsible for it, they may not want to bear the budgetary
cost of so doing.  On the other hand, if the skilled
mathematician only uses 20% of his/her time for the cash
forecast, it may be better for this person to be in the
Analysis/Research Department which can make good use of
the remaining 80%.
If a longer-tem forecast is constructed, this could be handled
by the research/macroeconomic team, as it will involve
economic, perhaps econometric skills and match well with
other work undertaken in that area.  The longer-term forecast
will still be useful to the operational team — for instance in
deciding on the maturity of operations — but they will not rely
on it on a day-by-day basis.
Some central banks take the view that the short-term forecast
gives rise to policy decisions regularly:  operations cannot
simply respond to the forecast on an automatic basis, since —
for instance — the size of the surplus may raise questions of
affordability of liquidity management.  They argue that the
forecast team should therefore be close to the policy area of
the bank.
It is certainly very important to be aware of the distinction
between an operation which is largely automatic and carries
no policy signal, and an operation which does include an
element of policy (for instance, a decision to let short-term
rates fall rather than drain all the surplus liquidity);  and to
ensure that policy decisions are taken consciously and at the
appropriate level.  This also begs the question as to how such
‘reactive’ policy decisions are communicated to the market, if
at all.  But it does not, in itself, determine the location of the
team which compiles the forecast.  Rather, it determines the
decision path for operations undertaken on the basis of the
forecast.
Regardless of the location of the forecast team, several
different areas of the central bank will have to provide input
into the forecast.  It is important that they are at least aware
of the purpose of the forecast.  If other areas, or even more so
government departments, view requests by the forecast team
as ‘yet more pointless data demands’, they may not in practice
give it the same care and attention, or deliver as promptly, as if
they appreciate that the forecast is used to support the central
bank’s monetary operations.  The forecast team could
undertake periodic seminars to explain to colleagues how the
data is used and what for.
Publication of the forecast
Should the short-term forecast be published?  And if so, how
frequently, and with what level of detail?  Here it may be
useful to consider the question from the point of view of the
market, since the central bank itself clearly gains no new
information by publishing (unless there is a strong market
reaction to a particular forecast, but this would be unusual).
The key question for the market will be:  is the market long or
short of liquidity?  And what operations will the central bank
undertake as a result?  Treasurers in commercial banks are
unlikely to care much about the composition of the forecast —
which of the autonomous factors are driving the net change in
liquidity? — since this will not make a difference to their
behaviour.  The Bank of England splits the forecast into
changes in cash in circulation, and other autonomous factors
(in the past more detail was published).  The ECB publishes a
single figure for autonomous factors.  The US Fed does not
publish a forecast at all.  Some central banks do not publish
because they do not judge their forecast to be of good enough
quality.  Some central banks are reluctant to publish data
about short-term changes in their foreign exchange reserves.
Publication of a single figure for the net change in autonomous
factors can safeguard this information.(1)
In general, it may be useful to an individual treasurer to know
how his position compares with that of the overall market.  For
instance, if a treasurer is short of liquidity, and knows that the
market as a whole has a surplus, he may try to borrow funds in
the market;  but if he knows the market as a whole is short, he
may wait until the next central bank operation, rather than
trying to borrow when conditions are difficult.  The treasurer is
asking the question:  are the funds, or is the demand for funds,
out there in the market?
On days on which the central bank is conducting an operation,
there is are additional questions:  is the central bank aiming to
bring the market back to balance in its operations, and is there
any signal to be read into the central bank’s actions?
The Bank of England and the ECB both operate with a
one-month reserve maintenance period, and conduct regular
OMO once a week.  Ahead of the operation, they publish a
forecast of the forecast volume of lending required in order for
the banking system as a whole to maintain reserves at the
(1) If net government transactions across the central bank’s books are expected to be
close to zero, and the market can produce a reasonable forecast of cash demand, it
might be able to imply a figure for net foreign exchange reserves movements;  but it
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targeted average level for the coming week;  and in normal
conditions they aim to lend exactly that amount.  In doing so,
they affirm to the market that there is no monetary policy
signal in the volumes being provided:  the central bank is
simply accommodating forecast aggregate demand.  If the
forecast is accurate and the market believes it to be so, there
will be no expected use of SFs, and market rates are likely to
reflect the policy rate.  Although the operation is essentially
accommodative, the forecast is necessary since the market
does not know what the autonomous factors will be, and
individual firms do not know how others will bid.  There will
normally be excess demand in bidding at the OMO, and if the
central bank satisfied all bids in full, it would in fact be
providing excess liquidity (or draining too much, if the
operation were in the other direction).  This would probably
lead to use of SFs — whether to deposit the excess or borrow
to cover the shortage created — with a consequent impact on
market interest rates after the OMO operation.
The logic in publishing the forecast only as far out as the next
OMO (ie up to one week, in the case of the Bank of England
and the ECB) is that the operation is only intended to balance
liquidity for this period, and the forecast further out is less
certain.  If the central bank conducts OMO every day, it could
publish the forecast simply for the current day.
If the forecast is not published, but the central bank aims to
meet aggregate demand, and the market expects it to do so,
the impact should be broadly the same as if the forecast were
published — to the extent that a published forecast, when
compared with OMO results, confirms the stated policy of
accommodative operations.  That said, there is still a benefit to
publishing, as it allows the participants to gauge their likely
transactions volumes with the central bank.  Moreover, if there
is a seasonality in the scaling — if overbidding is higher at
particular points of the year — then publication of the data can
help market participants to gauge their bids more accurately.
If a forecast is published and the central bank lends a different
amount, this could — intentionally — be used to send a signal
to the market.  For instance, in 2006 both the ECB and the
Bank of Canada found that market rates were diverging from
the policy rate (too high in the case of the euro area, too low
in Canada).  These central banks adjusted the amount provided
away from the forecast (over-lending and under-lending
respectively) in order to influence market rates, and made this
clear to the market.
If there is a surplus of liquidity in the market which the
central bank does not intend to drain fully, then publishing a
forecast would send a clear signal to the markets, and would
be expected to push short-term interest rates down to the
SF level.  A very similar result is likely if the forecast is not
published;  but the market will be more uncertain about
conditions, and this could lead to more rate volatility and a
greater reluctance at times to participate in the interbank
market.
Examples of liquidity forecasts can be found in Annex 2.
Using the forecast
The accuracy of the forecast, and its use (central bank OMO)
can be enhanced if the behaviour of the various items is well
understood.
• An excess or shortage of liquidity will be expected to affect
interest rates, and perhaps indirectly the exchange rate.
Does this happen?  It may be possible to use developments
in market rates as a check on the liquidity forecast:  if rates
are moving unexpectedly, might this indicate that the
forecast is wrong?  It should also be possible, over time, to
analyse the relationship between divergences from the
targeted level of liquidity, on the one hand, and short-term
market rates on the other.  This will help the central bank to
have a better picture of the demanded level of reserves, and
the thresholds which typically trigger a market response.
• Do changes in demand for foreign exchange matter?  And
does the central bank (CB) monitor black market/street
rates?  A weakening of the exchange rate may indicate a lack
of confidence in the domestic currency, which will typically
be accompanied by reduced demand for it.  Even if the
central bank operates an official exchange rate, it still makes
sense to pay attention to the street, or black market rate, for
the information it will provide.(1)
• Is it clear which CB liabilities are remunerated?
Conceptually, this should be clear.  For instance, some
countries will remunerate required or contractual reserves,
but not balances above that.  However, the balance sheet
may simply show banks’ current accounts.  Liquidity
managers need enough information to know whether banks
will be expecting to hold unremunerated reserve balances or
not.  It will also be important to be able to distinguish
between liabilities carrying market rates of return, and
below market rates.
• How will changes to payment systems, or other financial
sector developments, affect cash demand and demand for
free reserves?  Enhancements to an RTGS payment system
may reduce the need for precautionary balances.  Or if
banking supervisors make changes to the regime for liquid
asset requirements, the banking system’s demand for
balances at the central bank may be affected.
(1) Some central banks are reluctant to monitor the black market rate, on the grounds
that it is, strictly speaking, illegal.  But where it can easily be observed, the central
bank should use the information.  As an example, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s
website in March 2007 showed the exchange rate at USD1 = Z$250, while the black
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• What about financial or political crises?  In some cases, a
crisis may increase the demand for central bank liquidity —
for instance, uncertainty about the creditworthiness of other
market participants, in response to a shock, will tend to
increase demand.  But a political crisis, if it is perceived to
create an exchange rate risk, may prompt banks to reduce
holdings of domestic currency liquidity temporarily.
Reserve averaging and the frequency of operations
Reserve averaging, whether over a week or a month, should
improve banks’ liquidity management (although in practice a
one-week period appears to make little difference — a longer
period is needed).  It may be particularly useful where the
central bank finds a short-term liquidity forecast difficult, as it
is normally much easier to be reasonably accurate over a two
or four week period, than on any given day.  Banks can of
course use SFs to help manage their liquidity (provided they
hold sufficient eligible collateral for any needed borrowing);
but the interest rate cost of using SFs would have a very
different impact on market behaviour than use of reserve
averaging.  In some countries, there may additionally be a
certain stigma associated with using SFs — sometimes as a
legacy of the way a previous system operated.  Even when the
central bank approach changes, so that use of SFs is seen as
neutral, it may take years before the banking system fully
accepts this.
It is still very important to take account of within-week and
within-month seasonality, and any know large transactions, as
they may push the banking system outside of its ‘comfort
zone’ for a day or two, and so impact on interest rates, even if
the system as a whole has the right amount of liquidity for the
period as a whole.
Changes to reserve maintenance requirements — for
example, extending the length of the period, or allowing
greater use of averaging,(1) or introducing a carry-over amount
or a range rather than a point target — may affect banks’
behaviour gradually, making forecasting harder for a period.
More information on reserve averaging can be found in
Handbook no.24.
With a perfect forecast and daily operations, the central bank
could in theory target free reserves to equal demanded
reserves exactly, on a daily basis.  But there would be no
obvious gain to the central bank as compared with a
one-month averaging period and weekly operations, and it
would involve more work and more risk.
Does the way banks use averaging give clues about future
behaviour?  If the banking system as a whole had a standard
pattern of holding reserves in a maintenance period, the
central bank could use this in helping to forecast the demand
for liquidity — for instance, if banks preferred to hold reserves
somewhat below the target level in the early part of the
maintenance period, and then above average towards the end.
This pattern might indeed be logical, as it would help banks to
avoid the risk of ‘burnt’ reserves.(2) But in practice, many
central banks find there is no regular pattern.  The US Fed, for
instance, publishes the average holding pattern for reserves;
but this is simply an average.  In most maintenance periods,
the actual pattern is different.
That said, in normal conditions, individual banks will tend to
keep reserves within certain bounds.  (The system as a whole
has little choice, if the central bank decides on the volume of
OMO, and the autonomous factors are outside the control of
the commercial banks just as much as they are out of the
control of the central bank.)  If there were indications that the
banks, or at least some banks, were trying to hold a
substantially different pattern, this might be a signal to the
central bank to ask questions and find out what is affecting
behaviour.
(1) Some central banks allow only partial averaging eg if the average requirement is 5%,
the minimum balance on a commercial bank’s account may be set at 3% or 4% rather
than zero.
(2) Burnt reserves occur if a bank exceeds its requirement (X currency units * the number
of days in the period) before the end of the maintenance period.  As banks cannot
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Summary
It is clearly important to remember the purpose of the liquidity
forecast, and indeed of the monetary operations undertaken
by the central bank.  If it is possible to structure operations —
the combination of OMO, SF and a reserve maintenance
period — such that errors in the liquidity forecast (which are
inevitable) have less impact, then it may be possible to
improve liquidity management, and gain the benefits for
market stability, market development and so on, even if
problems remain with the forecast itself.
It is also important to try to understand what motivates
behaviour of different items in the central bank’s balance
sheet, as this will give the central bank a better idea of when it
needs to respond to forecast developments.  Such an
understanding cannot be developed simply by looking at data:
it is necessary to communicate regularly with the main
participants in the market — primarily banks who have an
important role in the payment system — and the central bank
must be pro-active in this respect.
Relying on others for data, and for an understanding of the
data, points to a need to build and maintain good relationships
with a wide range of people (and there will be spin-off benefits
relating to market surveillance and management of
abnormal/crisis situations).  This is not a one-off exercise, but
needs to be undertaken continuously.  And the need to
manipulate a lot of data, at times in a complex way, clearly has
implications for the make-up of the team.
Finally, when faced with a seemingly impossible task, the
forecast team should start with what is possible, and aim for
continual improvement.26 Handbook No. 27  Liquidity forecasting
Annex 1
Example of government expenditure pattern
Table A1 Illustration of daily cash flow forecast for a given month
of which, salaries etc Other Total
Annual expenditure 60 40 100
Seasonality, current month 1.1 1.02 1.068
Forecast expenditure, current month 5.5 3.4 8.9
of which, known dates 1.1
Day
10 . 1 0 . 1 0
20 . 1 0 . 1 0
30 . 1 0 . 1 0
4 0.55 0.1 0.65
50 . 1 0 . 1 0
6
7
80 . 1 0 . 1 0
9 0.6 0.60
10 0.1 0.10







18 0.55 0.1 0.65
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Annex 2
Examples of published liquidity forecasts
Bank of England
(i) A non-OMO day (Monday 29 January 2007)
10.00 am Stg mn
Aggregate reserves forecast for today 17,742
Previous day’s aggregate holdings of reserves 14,836
Previous day’s aggregate reserves forecast error +26
Average aggregate reserves held to date in maintenance period 16,439
Residual average aggregate reserve requirement 17,059
Excess reserves 0
Previous day’s use of lending standing facility on aggregate 0
Previous day’s use of deposit standing facility on aggregate 0
Current standing facility rate — loans 6.25%
— deposits 4.25%
(ii) An OMO day (Thursday 21 September 2006)
Aggregate reserves forecast for today 18,019
Previous day’s aggregate holdings of reserves 18,376
Previous day’s aggregate reserves forecast error -124
Average aggregate reserves held to date in maintenance period 16,684
Residual average aggregate reserve requirement 16,596
Previous day’s use of lending standing facility on aggregate 0
Previous day’s use of deposit standing facility on aggregate 0
Current standing facility rate — loans 5.75%
— deposits 3.75%
Forecast liquidity shortage 30,796
Average forecast level of notes 40,011
Average forecast level for other autonomous factors -25,767
Forecast average reserves 16,552
Forecast error (since previous operation) -88
Amount of maturing OMOs 31,138
Size of OMO offered 30,800
(iii) A post-OMO announcement (Thursday 21 September 2006)
A round of fixed-rate operations is invited at 10.00 am.  The operation will comprise repos
at 4.75% maturing on 28 September.
10.15 am Stg mn
Size of OMO bid 101,225
Amount of OMO allocated 30,800
Percentage of OMO bid allocated 30.4%
Aggregate reserves forecast for today (post OMO) 18,019
ECB
‘The ECB normally aims to satisfy the liquidity needs of the
banking system via its open market operations.’
Data
Daily liquidity conditions (€ millions)
Reserve maintenance period 17/01/2007 to 13/02/2007
Average reserve requirements 175,756
Figures as at 29/01/2007
Average current account holdings in the MP 177,193
Current account holdings 179,732
Use of the marginal lending facility 2
Use of the deposit facility 12
Autonomous factors 257,760
Forecasts of autonomous factors (€ millions)
Estimate on 30/01/2007 of average daily autonomous factors 
for the period 29/01/2007 to 06/02/2007 248,100




Settlement date 31/01/2007 26/10/2006 30/11/2006 21/12/2006 none
Maturity date 07/02/2007 01/02/2007 01/03/2007 29/03/2007
Minimum rate (bids) 3.50% – – –
Marginal rate 3.56% 3.48% 3.58% 3.66%
Weighted average rate 3.56% 3.50% 3.58% 3.67%
Allotted amount* €292.5 billion €40 billion €40 billion €40 billion
(*):  + [plus] indicates liquidity providing and – [minus] indicates liquidity absorbing
operations.28 Handbook No. 27  Liquidity forecasting
Annex 3
Government cash flows in the euro area
From the ECB website, providing information on euro-member
government transactions across national central bank books.
In Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Portugal the volatility of the overnight
balances on government deposits with the central bank is low
or even close to zero.  Liquidity effects are therefore negligible.
In Ireland, the Government stabilises its balance with the
central bank around a target level.  The volatility of
government balances is therefore comparatively low.
In Spain, since February 2001, the Treasury has transferred its
deposits to the banking system on a daily basis via overnight
repos.  These transactions have completely offset the
unexpected liquidity shocks caused by Spanish Treasury
deposits.  The other sub-items contributing to the
approximately €15 billion total of government deposits at the
Banco de España (eg accounts related to social security,
autonomous government and other administrative agencies
related to the Spanish Government) are relatively stable and
do not cause large disturbances.  Information regarding
Treasury activities is publicly available on different websites.
The Banco de España posts the Public Debt Market Bulletin on
its website (www.bde.es) on a daily basis, giving information
on the outstanding amounts of Treasury bonds and bills, dates
of issuance, allotments, coupon payments and other items.
Data concerning the Spanish Treasury bond and bill market are
also available on Reuters’ pages TESORESP01 — TESORESP12
and on the Bloomberg page TESO.  Likewise, the Spanish
Treasury website (www.mineco.es) provides information on
government debt.
In France, an interest rate below the market level is paid on
government balances held with the central bank above a
certain threshold;  thus the Government has an incentive to
place its funds in the market at the end of the day.  Since
30April 2002, the ceiling of remunerated government
deposits has been reduced after a convention was signed
between the French Government and the Banque de France.
The French Treasury sets a target balance for its account.
Consequently, the volatility of the Government deposits is low.
Information on operations relating to the French Government’s
debt is available on the French Treasury’s website
(www.francetresor.gouv.fr).  Information on fiscal deadlines is
available in French only on another website
(www.impot.gouv.fr).  Tax and other public payments are
distributed evenly over the month.
In Greece, there is no upper limit on the amount of deposits
that the Government can hold with the Bank of Greece.
Remuneration is close to market rates, up to a certain
threshold.  In its efforts to enhance cash management
efficiency and reduce the volatility of its deposits, the Greek
Government has been placing funds in the form of term
deposits with credit institutions on a regular basis.
Information regarding government operations in government
bonds and Treasury bills (announcements, issue calendar,
results of previous auctions and historical data) is available on
Reuters’ page GR/PDMA01.  Further information on public
debt and budget implementation is also provided on the Greek
Treasury’s website (www.mof-glk.gr).
In Italy, the liquidity effects of government activities are
considerable.  No upper limit is applied to the government
deposit balance.  The Banca d’Italia remunerates the balances
held by the Government on the current account with an
interest rate close to market rates.  The main movements in
government deposits occur because of the transfer of tax and
social security payments to the Government’s account at the
Banca d’Italia.  Until mid-June 2002, the transfer of the tax
collection took place on the fifth working day after the
payment date (usually on the 23rd of each month or, if the
payment system is closed on the 23rd, on the next business
day).  Under a new arrangement introduced on 10July 2002
(Decree no. 63/2002, Article 1), at least 80% of the tax
collected has to be transferred to the Government on the third
working day following the day on which the payments were
made by taxpayers.  The rest has to be transferred in the
following two days.  This means that the main changes in
government deposits will now take place between the 21st
(due to calendar effects, sometimes the 20th or 19th) and the
23rd of each month.  Relevant amounts of liquidity are also
absorbed each year by tax payments in June and July (personal
income tax) and in August and December (corporate income
tax).  Conversely, liquidity is provided on the first business day
of each month, mainly because of pension and interest
payments.  The Italian Government sometimes decides to
carry out operations such as the issuance of bonds, buy-backs
and borrowing in the international market and the exact
amounts involved are only known at short notice, leading to
unexpected liquidity shocks.
The Italian Government provides information on its issuance
programme and outstanding debt on its website and through
wire services (see, for example, the index on Reuters’ page
TESOROITALIA;  only in Italian).  The Banca d’Italia also
provides information on the conditions of new issues and the
results of government bond and Treasury bill auctions (see the
index on Reuters’ page BANKITALIA02;  only in Italian).  The
Italian Association of Bank Treasurers (ATIC, see index on
Reuters’ page ATJA25) jointly with the consulting firm
Prometeia conduct a daily survey of the main banks established
in Italy, with the aim of forecasting the domestic liquidity flows
for the following week on a daily basis.  These forecasts are
published on wire services, along with information on liquidity
flows related to public debt in other EU Member States (see the
index on Reuters’ page PROMEUR01).Handbook No. 27 Liquidity forecasting 29
Annex 4
UK Treasury cash-flow management
The importance of central government cash-flow management
has increased since the Debt Management Office (DMO) took
over this responsibility from the Bank of England in 2000.
Whereas previously a significant element of cash-flow
management was met passively by adjusting the government’s
overdraft at the Bank, the policy now is to meet the whole of
the government’s residual cash management needs actively via
market borrowing and lending.
The DMO’s function is to raise the necessary cash to fund
government expenditure which is not met by tax receipts (or
the relatively small amount of net retail borrowing raised by
National Savings and Investments).  This is achieved through a
mixture of debt and cash management.  Debt management is
defined to cover the government’s overall borrowing
requirement for the financial year, whereas cash management
deals with the intra-year peaks and troughs.
Debt management: debt management aims to meet the
government’s long-term financing needs (the net sum of the
annual budget deficit/surplus plus any maturing loans):
long-term funding is managed on a medium to long-term
basis, and the annual remit is tied in to the annual budget
cycle.(1)
Cash management: The objective of cash management is to
balance the government’s cash inflows and outflows each day.
On days when the government’s cash revenue is less than its
cash expenditure, the DMO must borrow the shortfall via its
market operations.  Conversely, when there is a cash surplus
the DMO needs to lend this out (or repay prior borrowing).  To
do this cost-effectively requires good information on the
government’s cash flow, in aggregate, which in turn needs a
strong input from the government departments that give rise
to these flows.
The Cashflow Management Scheme was introduced in 2001.
Its objectives are to obtain reliable forecasts of departmental
cash flows to inform the Debt Management Office’s
operational work of managing the government’s daily cash
needs.  It covers the expenditure and receipts of spending
departments, but not the tax revenues received by the
revenue-collecting departments.
Advance information by method of payment is important for
monitoring cash flow because that is the form in which the
corresponding outturn emerges.  Unless departments tell the
Treasury about their expected transactions, the Treasury is
unlikely to learn of them until they are reported as transfers
through the banking system.  For cheques and Bankers
Automated Payments System (BACS)(2)flows this information
is generally available on the day before value is transferred, but
for same day electronic transfers made via Clearing Houses
Automated Payments System (CHAPS),(3) there is no prior
warning.  As payments via this method tend to be for high
values, this can cause the final position for the day to vary
considerably from forecast, which makes it much more difficult
for the DMO to equalise the day’s inflows and outflows via its
market dealings.  Reliable advance information on CHAPS
payments and receipts — in advance as well as on the day — is
therefore essential for an effective Cashflow Management
Scheme.
Seminars and workshops are held on a regular basis.  As a
further incentive, league tables are distributed on a monthly
basis to participating departments showing their variance
against forecast on a monthly and year-to-date basis.  Some
departments regard such ‘naming and shaming’ as a more
effective incentive than the charging arrangements (see
below).  Departments that have performed well under the
scheme have been known to mention their high position in the
league table in their annual reports.
The following section describes the structure of the Cashflow
Management Scheme as it operated in early 2006.  However,
from April 2006 the Scheme was extended to include new
charges and rebates for payments made via BACS.  BACS
payments are three-day electronic payments that represent
approximately 80% of departmental spending.
A pilot scheme was run from 1April 2004 involving the fifteen
large departments that use BACS as a payment method.
Departments responded positively and introduced procedures
to improve their forecasting.  For the first six months of 2005,
this resulted in a 45% reduction in shadow charges over the
same period in 2004.
It is proposed to allow a £15 million tolerance on the daily
BACS and a 5% tolerance on the monthly BACS forecasts
before a charge is incurred.  The 5% interest rate charge
applied is a proxy for the overnight repo rate;  it does not vary
as actual interest rates move.  To provide an incentive to
departments, all charges incurred under the Scheme will be
re-distributed on a pro-rata basis in line with their share of
total BACS usage and applied annually to their end-year
flexibility entitlement, which defines the amount of unspent
provision that a department may carry over to the next year,
subject to Parliament’s approval.
(1) For more detailed information on debt management, see www.dmo.gov.uk and
www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/handbooks/ccbshb05.htm.
(2) BACS flows are made electronically through a central clearing house and provide for
value to be exchanged (at the earliest) two days after the day of input.  They can be
used for making payments and collecting receipts by direct debit.
(3) CHAPS transfers are same-day bilateral electronic transfers used for making
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The departmental cash-flow management scheme
Each month spending departments are required to forecast, for
the following month, their total gross payments, broken down
by method of payment, and their total gross receipts.  They
must also show how they propose to finance the resulting net
payment flow, including the amount of supply funding they
want the Treasury to issue.  The large departments are also
asked to provide daily forecasts of their payments and receipts
through the CHAPS and BACS systems.
The largest departments, covering over 98% of gross voted
cash flows by value, are subject to a regime of charges and
rebates related to the accuracy of their cash-flow forecasts.
Gross charges are based on a stylised estimate of the cost to
the Exchequer attributable to departmental forecasting errors.
However, in order to give these departments a greater
incentive to improve their forecasting accuracy, these gross
charges are then rebated among them on a pro-rata basis
related to their share of the total planned gross cash flows
(ie both payments and receipts) for the year.  As a result, the
scheme is totally self-financing.  Once set at the beginning of
the year, the shares are not adjusted to take account of
subsequent revisions to departments’ spending plans approved
by Parliament.
The smaller departments are required to submit a forecast of
their gross payments and receipts each month for the
following month along with their request for supply to be
issued by HMTreasury, but are not subject to the charging and
rebate regime.
If a department draws insufficient supply for the month, it can
request additional funds at any time during the month,
provided that it has not exhausted the provision voted to it by
Parliament.  Departments can also amend the amount of
funding they require for the following month two days prior to
the month end.
At the end of each month the Treasury determines the
accuracy of departments’ forecasts for (i) monthly net cash
flow and (ii) daily CHAPS payments;  and calculates the
charges and rebates due.  Thresholds are applied, so that
errors below the following tolerance levels are not subject to
charges:
• within £5 million of each daily CHAPS payment forecast;
and
• within 5% of the monthly net payments forecast.
For CHAPS payments the departmental forecast used for
calculating charges is the last one reported up to the cut-off
point on the day before the cash transfer occurs.  If
departments change their plans after this cut-off point, they
will not escape a charge, but they are still expected to report
the change to the Treasury, so that the Treasury can adjust its
own forecasts.
Charges on errors in the daily CHAPS payment forecast are
calculated at a rate of 5% per annum, applied for one day.  An
error of £10 million in a daily CHAPS forecast would generate
a charge of:
£10m x 5%/365 = £1,370
The 5% rate is a proxy for the overnight repo rate:  it does not
vary as actual interest rates move.
On the other hand, for the monthly net payments, the
departmental forecast used for calculating charges is the
original forecast submitted, without amendment.
Charges on the error in the monthly cash-flow forecast are
calculated at a rate of 0.25% per annum, applied for one
month.  This is based on the perceived difference between
borrowing and lending rates.  For example, an error of
£10 million in a monthly forecast would generate a charge of:
£10m x 0.25%/12 = £2,083
The net charges or rebates are effected by adjustments to
departments’ end-year flexibility (EYF) entitlements.  A
department facing a net charge for the year would have its
administration or general costs EYF entitlement reduced by
this amount, whereas a department with a net rebate would
benefit from an increase to its administration or general costs
EYF entitlement.  This gives a real (albeit small) financial effect
to the charges, but avoids in-year action that might require
numerous supplementary estimates for relatively small sums.
(EYF is a device to enable spending departments to carry
forward unspent provision from one year into the next, subject
to Parliament’s approval (which is normally granted).)Handbook No. 27 Liquidity forecasting 31
Handbooks in Central Banking
The text of all CCBS handbooks can be downloaded from our website at:  
www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/handbooks_lectures.htm.
These handbooks are also available in Arabic (A), Russian (R) and Spanish (S).
No Title Author
1 Introduction to monetary policy (R) (S) Glenn Hoggarth
2 The choice of exchange rate regime (R) (S) Tony Latter
3 Economic analysis in a central bank:  models versus judgement (R) (S) Lionel Price
4 Internal audit in a central bank (R) (S) Christopher Scott
5 The management of government debt (R) (S) Simon T Gray
6 Primary dealers in government securities markets (R) (S) Robin McConnachie
7 Basic principles of banking supervision (R) (S) Derrick Ware
8 Payment systems (A) (S) David Sheppard
9 Deposit insurance (R) (S) Ronald MacDonald
10 Introduction to monetary operations — revised, 2nd edition (R) (S) Simon T Gray, Glenn Hoggarth and Joanna Place
11 Government securities:  primary issuance (R) (S) Simon T Gray
12 Causes and management of banking crises (R) (S) Tony Latter
13 The retail market for government debt (R) (S) Robin McConnachie
14 Capital flows:  causes, consequences and policy responses (R) (S) Glenn Hoggarth and Gabriel Sterne
15 Consolidated supervision of banks (S) Ronald MacDonald
16 Repo of government securities (S) Simon T Gray
17 Financial derivatives (S) Simon T Gray and Joanna Place
18 The issue of banknotes(1) (S) Peter Chartres
19 Foreign exchange reserves management (S) John Nugee
20 Basic bond analysis (A) Joanna Place
21 Banking and monetary statistics (A) (S) John Thorp and Philip Turnbull
22 Unit root testing to help model building Lavan Mahadeva and Paul Robinson
23 Consumption theory Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo
24 Monetary operations (A) (R) (S) Simon T Gray and Nick Talbot
25 Monetary and financial statistics (A) (S) Monetary and Financial Statistics Division
26 Developing financial markets Simon T Gray and Nick Talbot
27 Liquidity forecasting Simon T Gray
(1) Withdrawn from publication.  An updated version will be released in due course.32 Handbook No. 27  Liquidity forecasting
CCBS publications
The CCBS also aims to publish the output from its Research Workshop
projects and other research.  The following is a list of books published
or commissioned by CCBS:
Brealey, R, Clark, A, Goodhart, C, Healey, J, Hoggarth, G,
Llewellyn, D, Shu, C, Sinclair, P and Farouk, S (2001), Financial
stability and central banks — a global perspective, Routledge.
Capie, F, Goodhart, C, Fischer, S and Schnadt, N (1994), The future
of central banking: the tercentenary symposium of the Bank of
England, Cambridge University Press.
Davis, E P, Hamilton, R, Heath, R, Mackie, F and Narain, A (1999),
‘Financial market data for international financial stability’, Centre for
Central Banking Studies, Bank of England.*
Driver, R, Sinclair, P and Thoenissen, C (2005), Exchange rates,
capital movements and policy, Routledge.
Fry, M (1997), Emancipating the banking system and developing
markets for government debt, Routledge.
Fry, M, Goodhart, C and Almeida, A (1996), Central banking in
developing countries: objectives,activities and independence,
Routledge.
Fry, M, Kilato, I, Roger, S, Senderowicz, K, Sheppard, D, Solis, F and
Trundle, J (1999), Payment systems in global perspective, Routledge.
Goodhart, C, Hartmann, P, Llewellyn, D, Rojas-Suárez, L and
Weisbrod,S (1998), Financial regulation: why, how and where now?,
Routledge.
Gray, S and Nell, J (2005), ‘A new currency for Iraq’, Centre for
Central Banking Studies, Bank of England.
Halme, L, Hawkesby, C, Healey, J, Saapar, I and Soussa, F (2000),
‘Financial stability and central banks:  selected issues for financial
safety nets and market discipline’, Centre for Central Banking Studies,
Bank of England.*
Mahadeva, L and Sinclair, P (2002), The theory and practice of
monetary transmission in diverse economies, Cambridge University
Press.
Mahadeva, L and Sinclair, P (2004), How monetary policy works,
Routledge.
Mahadeva, L and Sterne, G (2000), Monetary frameworks in a global
context, Routledge.  (This book includes the report of the 1999
Central Bank Governors Symposium and a collection of papers on
monetary frameworks issues presented at a CCBS Research
Workshop.)
*These are free publications which are posted on our website at:
www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/publications/index.htm.
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